nday
CVE-2026-16662

Uninitialised bootloader stack disclosed into the measured-boot attestation record via a short EXPECTED_HASH TLV in MCUboot

mcu-tools / mcuboot

Disclosed . nday has no fix record for it yet; that does not mean no patch exists. None of the four PoC sources lists it. Not in CISA KEV.

why these tags

nday derives these tags by fixed rules from the facts below; NVD, the CNA and other sources do not assign them. Vocabulary and rules: ~/tags.

use of uninitialized memory
CWE-457, stated by the CNA zephyr and NVD, republishing [email protected]
physical
AV:P in CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N (CVSS 3.1) from the CNA zephyr
no authentication required
PR:N in CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N (CVSS 3.1) from the CNA zephyr
no user interaction
UI:N in CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N (CVSS 3.1) from the CNA zephyr
stage
DIS
disclosed
cvss
2.4 LOW v3.1

Lifecycle

x axis UTC; dot = exact minute, wide bar = date only, hollow = unknown or inferred.
time unknown
DISdisclosed
11-13T00:23Z
PATpatch
no record yet
ANAanalysis
no record yet
POCPoC
no record yet
ITWexploited
no record yet
KEVKEV
no record yet

Summary

boot_save_boot_status() in boot/bootutil/src/boot_record.c reads the image's EXPECTED_HASH_TLV into a stack buffer image_hash[IMAGE_HASH_SIZE] that is never zero-initialised. The TLV handler validates only the upper bound (len > sizeof(image_hash)) and then reads exactly len bytes, so a TLV shorter than IMAGE_HASH_SIZE leaves the tail of image_hash holding stale stack content. The subsequent copy into the boot record, memcpy(buf + offset, image_hash, sizeof(image_hash)), uses the fixed buffer size rather than len, so up to IMAGE_HASH_SIZE - 1 bytes of uninitialised bootloader stack are written into the measured-boot record.

The defect is reachable only under MCUBOOT_MEASURED_BOOT, and only when nothing has checked the length of the hash TLV before boot_save_boot_status() reads it. bootutil_img_validate() rejects a hash TLV whose length is not exactly sizeof(hash) (boot/bootutil/src/image_validate.c:345), and primary-slot validation is on by default (Zephyr's CONFIG_BOOT_VALIDATE_SLOT0 defaults to y), so in a default build the malformed image never reaches this code. Two kinds of build let a short TLV through:

Builds that use pure signatures (MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE, Zephyr CONFIG_BOOT_SIGNATURE_TYPE_PURE). The signature covers the image itself, so the hash-TLV check in bootutil_img_validate() is compiled out, and a pure-signed image normally carries no hash TLV. A hash TLV is still allowed in the unprotected TLV area, which the signature does not cover, so a short one can be added to a correctly signed image without invalidating it. This applies with every upgrade strategy, including direct-XIP and RAM-load, and the modified image can be delivered through any path that accepts a signed image. Builds with primary-slot validation turned off: the swap and overwrite loader built without MCUBOOT_VALIDATE_PRIMARY_SLOT, which checks only the image magic before calling boot_add_shared_data(), and the Zephyr single-slot loader (boot/zephyr/single_loader.c) built without it, including the MCUBOOT_VALIDATE_PRIMARY_SLOT_ONCE variant, which skips validation once the trailer records an earlier successful one. Placing the crafted image requires physical or flash-write access to the device; in a single-slot build with serial recovery enabled, the serial-recovery upload writes the primary slot directly and can place it as well. Outside pure-signature builds, the direct-XIP and RAM-load strategies in boot/bootutil/src/loader.c validate the selected slot unconditionally and are not affected.

It is also reachable through a time-of-check/time-of-use change to tamperable external flash between validation and the boot-record read.

In these configurations the boot record's measurement is already not trustworthy: the hash copied into the record is the image's own EXPECTED_HASH_TLV, which nothing has verified and which the attacker chooses. The defect therefore does not weaken attestation integrity any further. What it adds is a path for bootloader memory to leave the device: up to 63 bytes (IMAGE_HASH_SIZE - 1) of uninitialised bootloader stack are embedded in the measurement field that a downstream attestation service sends to a remote verifier. In the configurations analysed the residue is bootloader internal state (TLV offsets and lengths, flash addresses, loop state), not key material, but what occupies that stack region depends on configuration and on which code ran before boot_save_boot_status(). It is reported as a low-severity, defense-in-depth disclosure with no integrity or availability impact.

This is distinct from the already-fixed record_len integer underflow in the same routine (GHSA-8hrv-4cp5-4rg3). The fix rejects any EXPECTED_HASH_TLV whose length is not exactly IMAGE_HASH_SIZE.

Original text of the CVE record (cvelist), shown as published.

Exploit conditions

What an attack needs, read from the CVSS vector.
Attack vector AV:P
Physical: needs physical access to the device
Attack complexity AC:L
Low: no special conditions; the attacker can expect repeatable success
Privileges required PR:N
None: no account or authorization needed
User interaction UI:N
None: no action by anyone other than the attacker

CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

CVSS 3.1 vector from the CVE record, scored by the CNA zephyr.

Event log

+DISdisclosed

CVE record published by zephyr. CVSS 2.4, low.

src cvelist · nday , observed live · raw
{
  "id": 68677,
  "type": "disclosed",
  "source": "cvelist",
  "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-16662",
  "occurred_at": "2026-11-13T00:23:00.336Z",
  "observed_at": "2026-11-13T01:04:22.549374Z",
  "is_backfill": false,
  "dedupe_key": "",
  "detail": {
    "cvss": {
      "source": "cna",
      "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "version": "3.1",
      "base_score": 2.4,
      "base_severity": "LOW"
    },
    "ssvc": {
      "timestamp": "2026-11-17T16:37:11.462971Z",
      "automatable": "no",
      "exploitation": "none",
      "technical_impact": "partial"
    },
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "date_published": "2026-11-13T00:23:00.336Z",
    "assigner_short_name": "zephyr"
  }
}

Report an error

report an error or omission

Something on this page wrong or missing? Tell the editors; if they accept it, this page's revision log says so publicly. Upstream data is not changed.

Researcher discussion

0 researchers mentioned this in the last 7 days

Posts on X by researchers on nday's list that mention this CVE, shown as posted. nday does not check them.

nday has not collected any post on X by listed researchers that mentions this CVE.

Discussion

0 comments

No comments yet.