nday
CVE-2026-127916

MCUboot image hash span is not bounded against the slot, allowing a read past the flash area during image validation

mcu-tools / mcuboot

Disclosed . nday has no fix record for it yet; that does not mean no patch exists. None of the four PoC sources lists it. Not in CISA KEV.

why these tags

nday derives these tags by fixed rules from the facts below; NVD, the CNA and other sources do not assign them. Vocabulary and rules: ~/tags.

out-of-bounds read
CWE-125, stated by the CNA zephyr and NVD, republishing [email protected]
local
AV:L in CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L (CVSS 3.1) from the CNA zephyr
no authentication required
PR:N in CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L (CVSS 3.1) from the CNA zephyr
no user interaction
UI:N in CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L (CVSS 3.1) from the CNA zephyr
stage
DIS
disclosed
cvss
2.9 LOW v3.1

Lifecycle

x axis UTC; dot = exact minute, wide bar = date only, hollow = unknown or inferred.
time unknown
DISdisclosed
11-13T00:23Z
PATpatch
no record yet
ANAanalysis
no record yet
POCPoC
no record yet
ITWexploited
no record yet
KEVKEV
no record yet

Summary

bootutil_img_hash() computes the image digest over ih_hdr_size + ih_img_size + ih_protect_tlv_size bytes, all three taken from the candidate image's header, and reads that span out of the slot without checking that it fits in the flash area. The three sizes are also summed without an overflow check. Nothing earlier on the validation path bounds the whole span either: bootutil_img_validate() compares the image size against bootutil_max_image_size() only after the hash has been computed.

The callers bound part of the span, or none of it:

On the swap and overwrite upgrade path, boot_validate_slot() first runs the image header check (boot_is_header_valid(), later boot_check_header_valid()). Before MCUboot 2.2.0 that check covered only ih_hdr_size + ih_img_size, so for every image the protected-TLV area (ih_protect_tlv_size, a uint16_t, up to 65535 bytes) was hashed without being bounded. From 2.2.0 the check includes ih_protect_tlv_size, except for a compressed image in the secondary slot when MCUBOOT_DECOMPRESS_IMAGES (CONFIG_BOOT_DECOMPRESSION) is enabled, which leaves the same gap of up to 64 KB. Zephyr's single-slot and firmware loaders (boot/zephyr/single_loader.c, boot/zephyr/firmware_loader.c) read the header with boot_image_load_header(), which bounds ih_hdr_size + ih_img_size against the flash area. Before MCUboot 2.4.0 that bound did not include ih_protect_tlv_size, which leaves the same gap of up to 64 KB. From 2.4.0 these loaders bound the whole span. The serial recovery image-list and image-state handlers (bs_list() and bs_set() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c) call bootutil_img_validate() with no header check at all, so on those paths ih_img_size is unbounded as well.

The image is hashed before its signature is checked, so anyone who can place an image in a slot (an OTA or SMP update delivered through the application, or serial recovery) reaches this read before authentication.

Whether a malformed header produces an actual read beyond the area depends on the flash backend:

Backends whose flash_area_read() bounds-checks the request (Zephyr, Espressif, NuttX, Mbed) return an error once the chunked read crosses the end of the area. Validation fails and the image is rejected, with no over-read. With MCUBOOT_HASH_STORAGE_DIRECTLY (Zephyr CONFIG_BOOT_IMG_HASH_DIRECTLY_ON_STORAGE, available from 2.2.0, not enabled by default) the span is hashed through a single direct pointer into memory-mapped flash, with no bounds check. The Cypress PSoC6 port's flash_area_read() (boot/cypress/cy_flash_pal/cy_flash_map.c, from 1.6.0) does not bound the read: its assert()s compare against the area's absolute offset rather than its size, and it copies with memcpy().

The bytes read past the area feed only the digest, which is compared internally and never returned, so nothing is disclosed. The realistic effect is a read fault during image validation: up to 64 KB past the slot on the upgrade path and, before 2.4.0, on the Zephyr loaders, and potentially much further on the serial recovery handlers, which skip the header check. Where validation is repeated at every boot (a pending upgrade, or, before 2.4.0, the single-slot loader checking its image), the fault can recur on each reset and keep the device from booting.

The fix makes bootutil_img_hash() add the three sizes with boot_u32_safe_add() and reject an image whose span, including the sector offset used in swap-using-offset mode, does not fit in the flash area, before any of it is hashed. Because the bound is applied where the bytes are read, it covers every caller.

Original text of the CVE record (cvelist), shown as published.

Exploit conditions

What an attack needs, read from the CVSS vector.
Attack vector AV:L
Local: needs a local or SSH session, or a user tricked into acting on the machine
Attack complexity AC:H
High: success depends on conditions outside the attacker's control, such as gathering details of the target or winning a race
Privileges required PR:N
None: no account or authorization needed
User interaction UI:N
None: no action by anyone other than the attacker

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

CVSS 3.1 vector from the CVE record, scored by the CNA zephyr.

Event log

+DISdisclosed

CVE record published by zephyr. CVSS 2.9, low.

src cvelist · nday , observed live · raw
{
  "id": 68670,
  "type": "disclosed",
  "source": "cvelist",
  "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-127916",
  "occurred_at": "2026-11-13T00:23:09.233Z",
  "observed_at": "2026-11-13T01:04:22.549374Z",
  "is_backfill": false,
  "dedupe_key": "",
  "detail": {
    "cvss": {
      "source": "cna",
      "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "version": "3.1",
      "base_score": 2.9,
      "base_severity": "LOW"
    },
    "ssvc": {
      "timestamp": "2026-11-17T16:02:43.785327Z",
      "automatable": "no",
      "exploitation": "none",
      "technical_impact": "partial"
    },
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "date_published": "2026-11-13T00:23:09.233Z",
    "assigner_short_name": "zephyr"
  }
}

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