The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (hostPID: true)
that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a
container, the coordinator:
1. **fork()s** a child process
2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces
3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root
filesystem (where /crio.sock is hostPath-mounted)
4. Calls **only seteuid(target_uid)** — changing the effective UID but leaving
the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted
capability set**
5. The check_no_privileged_perms() guard inspects only the Effective capability
set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0**
6. The VersionExecutable fingerprint invokes fpr_kind_executable with
process.command_line[0] — the target's argv[0], read from
/proc/<pid>/cmdline and **fully controlled by the workload**
7. fpr_kind_executable calls exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()
— executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount
namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace**
The executed process can call setuid(0) to restore full root with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor
container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.
## Affected Code
### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)
**File:** extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs
// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers
join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;
change_dir(current_dir);
switch_user(*process.uid)?;
if *process.uid != 0 {
perms::check_no_privileged_perms()
.expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints");
}
fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);
// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0
fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {
debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}");
seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))
}
### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)
**File:** fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go
// Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]
func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {
out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return string(out), nil
}
### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)
**File:** version_executable.rs
// Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint
return Some(vec![
fpr_kind_executable,
out_dir.to_string(),
String::from(&process.command_line[0]),
String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name),
]);
## Attack Pattern
**Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace)
**Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet
**Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node
**Attack sequence:**
1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured
versioned-executable pattern (node, python, python3, MainThread,
or contains java)
2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious
executable that calls setuid(0) to restore root
3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the
attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0
4. The attacker's code regains full root with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the host user
namespace
5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise