nday
CVE-2016-10142

An issue was discovered in the IPv6 protocol specification, related to ICMP Packet Too Big (PTB)…nday が生成したタイトルです(CVE レコードにタイトルなし)。

に公開されました。nday はまだ修正の根拠を取得していません。修正がないという意味ではありません。4 つの PoC ソースのいずれにも未掲載です。CISA KEV には現時点で未掲載です。

why these tags

nday derives these tags by fixed rules from the facts below; NVD, the CNA and other sources do not assign them. Vocabulary and rules: ~/tags.

remote, unauthenticated
AV:N、PR:N、UI:N in CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H (CVSS 3.0) from NVD's analysts
network
AV:N in CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H (CVSS 3.0) from NVD's analysts
no authentication required
PR:N in CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H (CVSS 3.0) from NVD's analysts
no user interaction
UI:N in CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H (CVSS 3.0) from NVD's analysts
現在の段階
DIS
公開日時
CVSS 基本値
スコアなし

ライフサイクル

横軸は UTC。点=分単位、幅広の帯=日付のみ、白抜き=不明または推定。
日時不明
DIS公開
2017-01-14T06:56Z
PAT修正
記録なし
ANA解析
記録なし
POCPoC
記録なし
ITW悪用
記録なし
KEVKEV
記録なし

概要

An issue was discovered in the IPv6 protocol specification, related to ICMP Packet Too Big (PTB) messages. (The scope of this CVE is all affected IPv6 implementations from all vendors.) The security implications of IP fragmentation have been discussed at length in [RFC6274] and [RFC7739]. An attacker can leverage the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments to trigger the use of fragmentation in an arbitrary IPv6 flow (in scenarios in which actual fragmentation of packets is not needed) and can subsequently perform any type of fragmentation-based attack against legacy IPv6 nodes that do not implement [RFC6946]. That is, employing fragmentation where not actually needed allows for fragmentation-based attack vectors to be employed, unnecessarily. We note that, unfortunately, even nodes that already implement [RFC6946] can be subject to DoS attacks as a result of the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments. Let us assume that Host A is communicating with Host B and that, as a result of the widespread dropping of IPv6 packets that contain extension headers (including fragmentation) [RFC7872], some intermediate node filters fragments between Host B and Host A. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv6 PTB error message to Host B, reporting an MTU smaller than 1280, this will trigger the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments from that moment on (as required by [RFC2460]). When Host B starts sending IPv6 atomic fragments (in response to the received ICMPv6 PTB error message), these packets will be dropped, since we previously noted that IPv6 packets with extension headers were being dropped between Host B and Host A. Thus, this situation will result in a DoS scenario. Another possible scenario is that in which two BGP peers are employing IPv6 transport and they implement Access Control Lists (ACLs) to drop IPv6 fragments (to avoid control-plane attacks). If the aforementioned BGP peers drop IPv6 fragments but still honor received ICMPv6 PTB error messages, an attacker could easily attack the corresponding peering session by simply sending an ICMPv6 PTB message with a reported MTU smaller than 1280 bytes. Once the attack packet has been sent, the aforementioned routers will themselves be the ones dropping their own traffic.

Original text of the CVE record (cvelist), shown as published.

イベント履歴

+DIS公開

mitre が CVE レコードを公開。

出典 cvelist · nday が に一括取り込み · 生データ
{
  "id": 160550,
  "type": "disclosed",
  "source": "cvelist",
  "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2016-10142",
  "occurred_at": "2017-01-14T06:56:00Z",
  "observed_at": "2026-11-13T05:36:28.781738Z",
  "is_backfill": true,
  "dedupe_key": "",
  "detail": {
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "date_published": "2017-01-14T06:56:00.000Z",
    "assigner_short_name": "mitre"
  }
}

Report an error

report an error or omission

Something on this page wrong or missing? Tell the editors; if they accept it, this page's revision log says so publicly. Upstream data is not changed.

研究者の投稿

過去 7 日間に 0 人の研究者が言及

リストの研究者が X でこの CVE に触れた投稿です。原文のまま表示し、nday は検証していません。

リストの研究者が X でこの CVE に触れた投稿は、まだ収集していません。

Discussion

0 comments

No comments yet.